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Abstract  
Using the Chinese urban household survey data between 1997 and 2006, we find 
that income inequality has a negative (positive) impact on households’ consumption 
(savings), even after we control for family income. We argue that people save to 
improve their social status when social status is associated with pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits. Rising income inequality can strengthen the incentives of 
status-seeking savings by increasing the benefit of improving status and enlarging the 
wealth level that is required for status upgrading. We also find that the negative effect 
of income inequality on consumption is stronger for poorer and younger people, and 
income inequality stimulates more education investment, which are consistent with the 
status seeking hypothesis. 
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1 Introduction 
The Chinese consumption has been low and declining during the last two decades. 
According to the Chinese urban household survey data, the average propensity to 
consume of urban residents has declined from 82% in 1997 to 75% in 2006.1 Several 
explanations have been proposed for this phenomenon, including demographic 
changes (Kraay, 2000; Modigliani and Cao, 2004), high income growth and habit 
(Horioka and Wan, 2007), precautionary savings (Chamon and Prasad, 2008; Kuijs, 
2006; Meng, 2003), the change of return rate of investment (Wen, 2009), and the 
increasing sex ratio (Wei and Zhang, 2009).  
In this paper, we explore another potential cause of declining consumption: the 
rising inequality. Rising inequality could reduce consumption in two ways. First, if the 
propensity to consume decreases with income, then at the macro level, we will find 
that consumption decreases with inequality.2 Second, we propose another explanation 
that is based on people’s desire to improve their social status. More specifically, people 
care about their social status that is associated with pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
benefits. Social status often depends on a family’ rank in the wealth distribution or 
indicators such as the education attainment, which is closely associated with wealth 
when the credit market is imperfect. As a result, in order to ascend in the status 
hierarchy or keep the social status in the “Rat Race”, families try to accumulate wealth 
by increasing savings. When income inequality increases, the benefit gap between the 
high-status and low-status groups widens, which in turn strengthens the incentives of 
                                                             
1
 Authors’ calculation. The definition of APC is living expense excluding education expenditure divided 
by disposable income. The change of the APC we find is quite similar to that in Chamon and Prasad 
(2009), although the level of APC in our paper is higher than that their paper. The difference in the 
levels comes from the fact that they include transfer expenditures as savings while we do not. 
2
 Inequality may also leads to a decline of savings. Alesina and Perotti (1996) propose that income 
inequality would increase social tensions, thus increasing the risk of investment and reducing private 
saving rate.  
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status-seeking savings. Furthermore, rising income inequality also raises the entry 
wealth level for the high-status group, which means that more savings are needed for 
one to enter the high-status group.  
The first, or the “macro”, reason for the inequality-consumption link is caused 
mechanically by the non-linear association between consumption and income at the 
micro, or household, level. If only the macro mechanism is at work, then inequality 
should not affect consumption at the household level, once household income is well 
controlled for. In contrast to the macro mechanism, the status-seeking hypothesis 
implies that given household income, rising income inequality can still discourage 
(stimulate) households’ consumption (savings).  
We develop a simple model, which illustrates that households tend to save more 
when the income gap widens, i.e., when it becomes harder to move up to the 
high-status group. Moreover, income inequality has a larger effect on consumption and 
savings for poorer and younger people, because they have stronger incentives for 
moving up. Finally, the model also shows that people at the bottom may simply give 
up on savings when the income gap is too large.  
The rapid increase in income inequality in China and the large variation across 
regions and groups provide us an opportunity to test the status-seeking hypothesis. 
According to a report by the World Bank in 2005, China’s Gini coefficient has risen 
from 0.33 to 0.47 in two decades. Moreover, there is a substantial variation across 
regions and time. For instance, our calculation illustrates that the Gini coefficient 
among urban residents in Beijing has risen from 0.19 in 1997 to 0.25 in 2006, while 
the measurement in Zhejiang province has changed from 0.23 to 0.32 during the same 
period.  
Drawing on the Chinese Urban Household Survey data in 9 provinces between 
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1997 and 2006, empirical results show that income inequality within a reference group 
(families in the same province and same age group) has a negative effect on household 
consumption after we control for household income. This implies the existence of 
mechanisms at work other than the “macro” mechanism and is consistent with the 
status-seeking hypothesis. In our sample, the Gini coefficient in urban areas rose from 
0.23 in 1997 to 0.29 in 2006, which implies a decline of the average propensity to 
consume (APC) by 1.63 percentage points, about 23% of the decline of the APC 
during the period. In addition, we find that inequality has a larger impact on 
consumption of the poor and the young, but we do not find the poor in our sample 
giving up probably because the urban sample does not include the poor people most of 
whom live in rural China. We also find that rising inequality has a strong positive 
effect on families’ investment in education, which is an important indicator of social 
status. Finally, our main results remain in a series of robustness checks. 
To our best knowledge, we are the first to find micro evidence that rising 
inequality could be a reason for declining consumption. Existing studies emphasize the 
link as a “macro” phenomenon, and do not consider the micro mechanism—the impact 
of inequality on an individual household’s consumption or saving behavior given one’s 
income.3 Alesina and Perotti (1996) propose a micro mechanism of how income 
inequality could increase social tensions, thus increasing the risk of investment and 
reducing private saving rate, but their empirical evidence is based on cross-county data 
at the macro level. We are also among the first to show, both theoretically and 
empirically, the importance of status-seeking for increasing savings. The recent 
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 For instance, Musgrove (1980), Menchik and David (1983), Stoker (1986) and Dynan et al. (2004) 
suggest that due to the differences in the concavity of utility function, precautionary saving, or bequest 
motive, the saving rate of high-income families is higher than that of low-income families. Smith (2001) 
uses cross-country data to confirm that to the extent of credit market imperfection, income inequality 
has a robust, positive effect on aggregate private saving rates. However, there are also some studies that 
find no effect of income distribution on the aggregate saving rate (Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven, 2000). 
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literature on economic growth has demonstrated that the status-seeking saving motive 
can be beneficial for economic growth (Corneo and Jeanne, 2001; Futagamia and 
Shibatab, 1998; Gong and Zou, 2001; Pham, 2005), but there is little direct micro 
evidence to confirm the importance of the status-seeking motive. 
The rest of the paper is unfolded as follows. The second section discusses how 
status-seeking motive can lead to a direct effect of income inequality on household 
consumption and saving behavior. Section 3 describes a model that derives testable 
hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Section 4 introduces our econometric 
specifications. Section 5 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. 
Section 6 and 7 report empirical findings and robustness tests. Section 8 concludes.  
2 Status Seeking and Household Consumption and Saving Behavior 
According to Weiss and Fershtman (1998), social status is the rank of an 
individual or a group of individuals in a given society, based on commonly agreed 
criteria such as wealth, education, origin, occupation, etc. In addition, social status is 
often associated with a particular group, and shared by all members of the group, 
regardless of their individual characteristics.  
Sociologists have long emphasized that individuals care about social status, and 
human behaviors are often motivated by the desire to improve ranks in the hierarchy, 
which is no less important than pecuniary rewards such as consumption.4 Early 
justifications focus on psychological returns of higher status. Cole et al. (1992) and 
Corneo and Jeanne (1999) emphasize the advantages of the high status in accessing 
non-market resources, and show that people care about their status in equilibrium even 
if social status does not directly enter the utility function. They highlight some social 
rewards of attaining higher social status. First, there is a favorable club effect. Many 
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 See Weiss and Fershtman (1998) for a review on the literature. 
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social activities or opportunities such as marriage and invitation to a party or club only 
occur within the group of people with the same social status. Second, benefit of 
improving status is related to the fact that people with high status may have privilege 
in rationing non-market goods. Furthermore, those with high status can gain trust, 
courtesy, and approval, and build up leadership more easily.  
Because of these rewards, individuals try to improve their social status through 
investments in assets (including physical, human, and social capital), group affiliation, 
and an appropriate choice of actions, among which the status-seeking saving motive 
has been the focus in the literature (Weiss and Fershtman, 1998). Cole et al. (1992) 
prove that the existence of non-market decisions can naturally yield a wealth-is-status 
equilibrium, where social status is determined by the rank in the wealth distribution.5 
As a result, status seeking becomes an important motivation for wealth accumulation. 
People are more frugal in consumption and save more than the case where there is no 
status-seeking. The connection between wealth and social status can be indirect. For 
example, the status contest may directly depend on indicators such as education, but to 
afford better education, families need to accumulate wealth in the first place.  
Rising income inequality can intensify the status-seeking motive through several 
channels. First, the increase in income inequality usually makes it more attractive to 
enter the high-status club because the difference in (financial and non-financial) 
resources between the high- and low-status groups enlarges. This corresponds to the 
effect of “status prize” in Corneo and Jeanne (1999). Second, higher inequality implies 
a larger wealth gap between the high- and low-status groups, which means that 
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 They show that this equilibrium seems to be more stable than aristocratic equilibrium or say 
status-inherited equilibrium because the latter is not subgame perfect. Social status also depends on 
other indicators such as education, occupation, and relative income (Fershtman, Murphy, Weiss, 1996; 
Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998).  
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low-status families need to save more to join the high-status club.6 These channels 
lead to a positive effect of income inequality on household savings. However, when 
the dispersion of wealth becomes so large that the marginal status gain achieved by 
accumulating additional wealth declines or it becomes infeasible for the low-status to 
move up, it is possible that rising income inequality weakens status-seeking saving 
incentives (Corneo and Jeanne, 2001).7 Therefore, the relationship between income 
inequality and saving incentives is essentially an empirical question, and it can be 
hump-shaped rather than monotonic. 
3 Model 
We construct a simple model to illustrate how income inequality could affect 
consumption due to the status-seeking motive. In our model, an individual lives for 
two periods, and there is some exogenously given income in the first period, Y1. He 
consumes C1 and saves S=Y1-C1 in the first period, and consumes C2=S in the second 
period. A unique feature of the model is that the individual also derives utility from a 
high social status.8 Suppose that there are two social clubs (H) in the society: H=1 if it 
is a high-status club and H=0 if it is a low-status club. The high-status club 
membership is associated with both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefit, which is 
denoted B, while the low-status club pays nothing. Thus, utility derived from social 
status is simply B*H.  
Assume that the social status for the first period is given, which for simplicity is 
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 In addition, the dispersion in the income distribution may increase the stratification of the society and 
intensify the competition for social status. This raises the marginal returns to save in the social 
competition, similar to the effect of “increasing segmentation” in Corneo and Jeanne (1999). 
7
 Corneo and Jeanne (2001) consider the effects of increasing inequality on initial wealth. They 
conclude that the dispersion of initial wealth distribution reduce status-seeking savings.  
8
 Cole et al. (1992) has proved that we can directly analyze the reduced form problem in which families 
directly gain utility from the social status, and the results are the same as those in a more complicated 
model where people do not directly care about social status but do care in the equilibrium because social 
status brings in some financial and non-financial benefits. 
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assumed to be 0, but the individual can change his second-period social status by 
accumulating wealth. There is a threshold wealth requirement, W, for joining the 
high-status club, where we assume W is exogenously given for simplicity.9 Thus, H is 
a function of S, where WSifSHWSifSH <=≥= 0)(;1)( .  
Formally, an individual select C1, C2 and S to maximize the following utility 
function,10  
,0)(;1)(
..
)](*)([)(
2
11
21,, 21
WSifSHWSifSH
SC
YSCts
SHBCUCUMax SCC
<=≥=
=
=+
++ β
          (1) 
where β is the discount factor. The utility function U is well behaved, i.e., increasing 
and concave. The model can be simplified to 
)],|(*)([)( 1 WSHBSUSYUMaxS ++− β                (2) 
where the only choice variable is the savings S.  
3.1 Optimal Solutions 
We solve for optimal solution by graphical illustrations. Part (a) of Figure 1 
illustrates how the lifetime utility would vary with savings given one’s status: 
)0|( =HSV  for a low-status individual and )1|( =HSV  for a high-status individual, 
where BHSVHSV β+=== )0|()1|( . Both functions are maximized at S*.  
People may save more than S* because they can derive utility from entering the 
high-status club with more savings, i.e., )0|()1|( * =>= HSVHSV  for S in the 
range of ),( * SS , where S  is the largest possible saving that satisfies the condition 
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 If there is a limit on the size of the high-status club, W is endogenously determined in the model. The 
main conclusions still hold in this case. 
10
 For simplicity, we have assumed that families can keep the high-status even though they exhaust all 
the wealth accumulation in the second period. If instead, families need to save at least W to keep the 
high-status, the savings at the end of the second period will be affected by the status-seeking motive. 
The model can also be easily extended to a more general setup, such as there being more than two clubs, 
families having different social status in the first period, the benefit of the high-status being nonlinear, 
and there are more than two periods. The conclusions still hold.   
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)0|()1|( * === HSVHSV . People have no incentives to save more than S , because 
they could be better off by saving only S* even they are still in the low-status club. 
Note that both *S  and S  are increasing functions of Y, which follows from the 
setup of the utility function. Thus, we could use *S  and S  to define one’s income 
level. For the purpose of the following analysis, we have three income groups by 
comparing *S  and S  to W: one is rich if WS ≥* , one is in the middle class if 
SWS ≤<* , and one is poor if WS < . 
The actual lifetime utility function, described by the solid curves in Figure 1, 
depends on the income group one belongs to. It is )0|( =HSV  when the individual’s 
savings S is less than W, but switches to )1|( =HSV  when S exceeds W. It highlights 
a discontinuous increase of βB at S=W due to the upgrade of the status. Based on one’s 
income level, there are three scenarios.  
 
Case 1: Cheap Club Membership for the Rich 
For the rich, or WS ≥* , the membership requirement for the high-status club is 
low, and they choose S* and enter the high-status club, as shown in Figure 1(c). The 
high-status club is “cheap” in the sense that a rich individual enters the club even if he 
does not save for the purpose of joining the club, and he chooses the optimal 
consumption and savings as if there were no membership benefits.  
 
Case 2: Excessive Savings for the Middle Class 
The middle class, or SWS ≤<* , save aggressively, as shown by Figure 1(d). In 
this case, the wealth requirement of the high-status membership W is larger than S*, or 
the optimal savings when there were no status-seeking incentives, but acquiring the 
high-status is better than staying in the low-status club. As a result, the optimal choice 
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is to save W and join the high-status club. In other words, people save excessively 
(more than the optimal savings S* without status-savings incentives) for the purpose of 
entering the high-status club. 
 
Case 3: The Poor Giving Up 
The poor, or WS < , give up status-seeking. As illustrated by Figure 1(e), now 
acquiring higher status by sacrificing consumption is no longer desirable or improving 
status becomes impossible at all. Thus, people give up seeking high-status and choose 
S* as if there is no club membership.  
 
3.2 Comparative Statics 
Club Wealth Requirement W 
Figure 2(a) summarizes how the optimal savings vary with W. For the rich, or 
WS ≥* , increasing W does not affect his optimal choice of savings. For the middle 
class, or SWS ≤<* , savings increase with W. In other words, rising W stimulates 
more savings (exactly equals W) from the middle class. For the poor, or WS < , they 
simply give up pursuing high-status so that they do not respond to increasing W. To 
summarize, when W increases, the savings for each individual either have no change or 
increase, except those who switch from “status seeking” to “giving up”. As long as 
there are not many “switchers”, the aggregate effect of W on savings will be positive. 
 
Club Benefits B 
An increase in the payoff of the high-status club induces a higher S , which 
means people are willing to save more to attain the high-status. As a result, some 
people who were originally giving up start to save excessively now. These people are 
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represented by the segment between 0S  and 1S  in Figure 3(b), where 0S  ( 1S ) 
represents the S  before (after) the change in B. People in other ranges do not change 
their savings. This suggests that rising club benefit increases savings on average, and 
all the increase comes from the enlargement of the status-seeking group.  
 
Young versus Old 
The effect of age can be examined by varying the discount factor β, where we 
assume that older people care less about the future and thus have a smaller β. 
Therefore, older people would have a weaker incentive for status-seeking, and thus 
smaller savings. Moreover, as β and B are complementary in the utility function, a 
lower β (for older people) means a lower marginal impact of the club benefit B on 
savings. 
 
3.3 Empirical Hypotheses 
In this section, we link income inequality to savings, which is the focus of 
empirical tests. An increase in inequality would mean two things: the increase of the 
club wealth-requirement W and an increase of the club benefit B. The comparative 
statics analyses suggest that on average, savings increase when W or/and B increases. 
However, the impact varies with W and age. Taking these together, we have the 
following three hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: On average, rising income inequality has a positive (negative) 
impact on savings (consumption).11  
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 The model can easily be extended to the case where there are many clubs. To the extreme, a family’s 
status is just its rank in the wealth hierarchy, which is assumed in a typical model in the literature. The 
conclusion still holds. The main difference between our model and the literature is that income 
 11 
 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of inequality on savings is small for both the poor and 
rich, but is large for the middle class. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of inequality on savings (consumption) is stronger for 
younger people. 
4 Empirical Models 
We test these hypotheses by estimating the following empirical model,  
  εδγβα ++++= XGiniYC **)ln(*)ln(  ,                      （1） 
where C is household consumption, including all living expenditures except education 
expense, Y is the families’ disposable income,12 Gini is the Gini coefficient, and X is 
other covariates.  
In equation (1), γ measures the impact of income inequality on consumption, 
which is expected to be negative, and β is the income elasticity of consumption.13 The 
existence of the status-seeking motive means that even after we control for family 
income, inequality still affects household consumption. However, if the link between 
income inequality and consumption works only through consumers’ heterogeneity in 
propensity to consume, then γ should be zero, particularly when we allow β to vary 
with income groups. Note that as long as β <1, APC declines with income, which 
would be consistent with the literature about consumers’ heterogeneity on saving 
                                                                                                                                                                                
inequality increases the benefit of acquiring higher status (B), while B is fixed in a typical model. In 
addition, there is a discontinuous increase of the return of savings in our model. These explain why a 
typical model finds the increase in inequality in initial wealth reduce savings while our model indicates 
rising income inequality tends to stimulate savings.  
12
 The disposable income includes wage, asset income, and transfers, excluding the social security 
contribution, income tax and accounting subsidy. Since the data quality of ‘savings’ is much worse than 
that of ‘consumption’, we focus on consumption in our empirical study and derive the responses of 
savings based on the results for consumption. 
13
 The prediction based on Alesina and Perotti (1996) is that γ should be positive, which is on the 
opposite of the prediction based on the status-seeking story. 
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propensity.  
For the measure of inequality, we focus on the Gini coefficient, using the income 
ratio of the richest 10% to poorest 10% as robust tests.14 Besides, we use Gini 
coefficient among peers or the reference group, rather than inequality of the whole 
society because most of the competition for non-market goods comes from peers 
(Coleman, 1990; Li and Zhu, 2006). Reference groups are the social or professional 
groups to which families compare themselves.15 The most relevant rank of social 
status for individual families is the rank among families living in the same region and 
of similar age. As a result, we use inequality within the reference province-age (plus 
and minus 5 years) group. For example, for families with a 31-year-old head, the 
reference group includes families with head aged 26-36 in the same province.16 All 
inequality indexes are based on income per equivalent person taking into account 
family size or scale. The results presented below use the equivalence scale in which 
one of the adults in the household has weight 1, the other adults have weight 0.7 and 
children's weight is 0.5.17 
Control variables are represented by X in equation (1), including the head’s age, 
the family equivalent scale, the average income of the reference province-age group, 
provincial fixed effects, age-group fixed effects and year fixed effects. We define five 
age group dummies, which are respectively under 34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and above 
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 The Gini coefficient reflects the average dispersion while the ratio 90/10 focuses on the difference on 
the tails. 
15
 Bakshi and Chen (1996) introduce the reference group’s average wealth in their theoretical model and 
Clark and Oswald (1996) provide empirical evidence for the importance of the reference level of income 
against which an individual compares himself or herself. Consequently, it is important to consider 
reference group when analyzing the effect of the status-seeking on behavior. 
16
 We use province instead of smaller regional units to ensure that there are sufficient samples in the 
group so that the inequality index is reliable. We also find very similar results when we apply fixed age 
groups for all families, for example for families with 30-years-old head and families with 39-years-old 
head, their reference groups are the same: families with head aged 30-39. 
17
 The results are quite robust to different family equivalent scales (see Atkinson et al., 1995 for 
definitions of family scale). 
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65.18 In addition, we control for the interactions between province and year dummies 
and those between age group dummies and year dummies to allow for the provincial 
and age-group effects to vary across years. Thus, the identification of our model relies 
on the difference in the nonlinear temporal changes in income inequality across age 
groups and provinces. 
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data come from the annual Urban Household Survey (UHS) conducted by the 
National Bureau of Statistics in China. The UHS covers all provinces in China, and 
uses a probabilistic sampling and stratified multistage method to select households. It 
is a rotating panel in which one third of the sample is replaced each year and the full 
sample is changed every three years. The sampled households are asked to keep 
detailed records of incomes and expenditures every day. It has demographic and 
income information for every member of the family. Unfortunately, it has no 
information on assets.  
We have access of data for nine Chinese provinces from 1997 to 2006, including 
Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shanxi and Gansu, 
which represent different regions and economic conditions. The mean values and the 
trends of the most important variables are quite comparable between our sample and 
the national sample. The statistics are available to interested readers on request. 
Since there is no information on each member’s expenditure, our analysis is based 
on consumption of the whole family. We drop families whose head is below age 25 or 
above age 75, because we cannot find enough families in these age groups to get 
reliable estimates of inequality measures. Finally, we exclude outliers with annual 
disposable income less than 100 RMB, ten families with highest income (annual 
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 Results are not sensitive to different ways of classify age groups. 
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disposable income more than 500,000 RMB), families whose living expenditure is 5 
times larger than the income, or is 2 times larger than the income but larger than 
200,000, and families whose family size is large than 10.19 Our final sample includes 
102,971 families in total. 
The simple time-series trend in Figure 3 seems to suggest that consumption 
declined while inequality rose in our sample period. The average propensity to 
consume (APC) dropped sharply from 86.6% in 1997 to 81.5% in 2006, while the 
within reference group inequality rose dramatically from 0.23 to 0.29. The within 
province inequality has a similar trend to that of within reference group inequality. 
Figure 4 suggests that there are large variations of Gini coefficient across both 
provinces and age groups, which is good for estimations. 
6 Estimation Results 
This section reports regression results. All regressions are Ordinary Least Square 
estimations. We focus on the results using Gini coefficient as the measure for income 
inequality. The estimates based on Ratio 90/10 show quite similar robust results, and 
are not reported to save space.20 
6.1 Status Seeking and Consumption 
Table 1 reports the effect of income inequality on household consumption using 
Gini coefficient as our inequality measure. We control for family income, the head’s 
age, the average income of the reference group, and province, year and age group fixed 
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 In 2002, the questionnaire was changed substantially. More detailed questions were included and the 
sample size was expanded from 21000 to 56000. These adjustments may cause the inconsistency of the 
caliber for the same variables between the data from 2002 to 2006 and that from 1997 to 2001. 
Accordingly, our estimation is based on the data from 1997 to 2006, and we use the data of 2002-2006 
as a robust check, and the results are similar. 
20 Particularly, when Ratio 90/10 increases by 1, the average household consumption decreases by 1.6 
percent and the average education investment increases by 7.4 percent. The difference across income 
groups and age groups are also similar to that based on the Gini coefficient.  
 15 
effects in these regressions. We also allow for the linear time trend of the average 
consumption to differ across provinces and age groups. 
Regression results show that given income, consumption declines with the Gini 
coefficient, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. The first column shows that after 
controlling for disposable family income, the Gini coefficient has a significant 
negative effect on household consumption. When the Gini coefficient increases by 0.1, 
household consumption drops by 3.8%. As expected, income itself has a positive 
coefficient. The magnitude of 0.763 means that when income rises by one percent, 
consumption increases by 0.763 percent. 
The impact of inequality on consumption still holds when we allow for different 
kinds of non-linear effects of income. We control for five income quintile groups, 
which are defined according to their income rank in the province-age group, in column 
2, and both income group dummies and their interactions with log(income) in column 
3 to allow different income groups to have different propensity to consume. The 
estimated coefficients on the Gini coefficient do not change much. In column 4, we 
control for the linear time trend for each province-age group and the result remains.21 
To summarize, we have found evidence supporting hypothesis 1, i.e. income inequality 
on average stimulates more status-seeking savings.  
6.2 Heterogeneous Effects across Income Groups 
In this part, we test Hypothesis 2, i.e., the impact of inequality on consumption 
varies with income. To do this, we define three income groups: poor for the bottom 
one third of the income distribution, middle-class for the middle one third, and rich for 
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 Besides the specifications reported in the table, we have tried many other specifications, such as 
controlling ten instead of five age categories, applying different age group categories (under 30, 
30-40,40-50,50-60, and 60 above), controlling more family characteristics (including family scale, 
heads’ education level and race), and the results are quite robust. 
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the top one third. We estimate the following model, 
.**
*)ln(*)ln(
54
321
εδγγ
γγγβα
++++
++++=
XrichGinirich
middleGinimiddleGiniYC
       （2） 
The variable “middle” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the family belongs to the 
middle class, and “rich” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the family is rich.  
Results reported in Table 2 show that the impact of inequality on consumption 
decreases with income. The first column of Table 2 shows that the coefficient of the 
interaction between middle and Gini is significantly positive. For this group, the 
impact of inequality is -0.333, relative to -0.530 for the poor. The interaction term of 
rich*Gini is also positive and significantly different from zero, with an estimated 
coefficient of 0.269, suggesting that the impact of inequality for the rich is even 
smaller (-0.261). Regressions based on the three sub-samples (the poor, the middle, 
and the rich) show a similar pattern (column 2 to 4): the effect of inequality on the 
consumption for the rich is significant negative at 10% significance level, but it is 
much weaker than that for the middle and for the poor. 
These results seem to show that the impact of inequality decreases with income 
(consistent with Hypothesis 2), and we do not find that the poor giving up (inconsistent 
with Hypothesis 2). One potential explanation is that our sample only includes urban 
households, and does not include poor households in China, most of whom live in the 
rural area. As a result, households in our sample are not poor enough to give up. 
6.3 Young versus Old 
We then test Hypothesis 3: income inequality has a larger impact on consumption 
for the young than the old, and results reported in Table 3 indeed confirm this. The first 
column shows that the interaction term young*Gini is negative and significant, 
suggesting that the negative effect of income inequality on consumption tends to be 
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stronger for the young (household head younger than 55) than for the old (55 or above). 
Regressions based on the two sub-samples (young versus old) show a similar pattern 
(column 2 and 3): for the young, income inequality has a significant negative effect on 
their consumption; while the effect is much weaker for the old. Finally, when we have 
five finer age groups (below 35, 35-45, 45-55, 55-65, and above 65), we find that for 
the oldest group (above 65), inequality has a significantly smaller effect on 
consumption compared to other groups. This provides stronger support that the old 
indeed has less status-seeking incentives than the young. 
6.4 Education Investment 
One specific way of improving status is investing in education. Education is not 
only considered as an indicator of social status itself, but also is correlated with higher 
income and wealth. 22  Thus, we hypothesize that rising income inequality may 
encourage households to increase education investment. Since there is generally very 
little education investment for adults, we only consider families with children under 
age 30.23 
Results reported in Table 4 indeed show that rising income inequality has a 
positive impact on education investment. Column 1 shows that the Gini coefficient has 
a strong positive effect on household education expenditure. When the Gini goes up by 
0.1, education expenditures increase by 50%. The positive effect of Gini coefficient on 
education expenditures remains when we control for the income group dummies and 
their interactions with Gini (column 2). 
Unlike the results for consumption, the effect of income inequality on education 
                                                             
22
 Because education expenditures are actually an investment instead of consumption, we have excluded 
them from consumption in our previous analysis. 
23
 We also try the specification that excludes families who have no kids under 25, and (or) whose kids 
are all under age 3, and (or) families who have kids at school but have no education expenditure. The 
results indicate stronger positive effect of income inequality on education expenditure. 
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expenditure does not decrease with family income (columns 3-6 of Table 4). Actually, 
the education investment of the rich may increase more than the poor as income 
inequality increases. This suggests that the rich may have stronger incentives than the 
poor in investing in children’s education, probably because the human capital of the 
parents are more difficult to be passed to the next generation compared to wealth.  
7 Robustness Tests 
7.1 Counterfactual Tests 
We argue that income inequality has a negative effect on household consumption 
because of the status-seeking motive of savings, but such motive should not affect the 
basic consumption for human needs. If we find a similar effect of income inequality on 
basic consumption, then our specification could be wrong. We use basic food 
consumption (cereal) to represent the subsistence expenditure in the robustness tests. 
As expected, the first column of Table 5 shows that income inequality has no effect on 
the subsistence consumption, or consumption of cereal. When we switch to non-basic 
food consumption as dependent variable, including cakes, fish, beverages and the 
expense at restaurants, we find status-seeking saving incentives again: inequality has a 
significant negative effect on non-basic food consumption (column 2 in Table 5).  
7.2 Alternative Stories 
Besides the social-status seeking story, there can be alternative stories to explain 
the negative effect of income inequality on consumption. One probable story is related 
to the housing market in China. Income inequality among the reference group can be 
positively correlated with provincial housing price. At the same time, rising housing 
price may reduce household consumption and stimulate savings for housing.  
To test whether housing price has caused the correlation between inequality and 
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consumption, we augment model (1) by including a variable of housing price index. 
The third column of table 5 shows that after we control for provincial housing price 
index in the regression, the coefficient of Gini does not change much from those 
reported in Table 1. Housing price itself does not have a significant effect on 
consumption. 
Another story is related to the imbalanced sex ratio in China. Wei and Zhang 
(2009) argue that the competition in the marriage market resulted from the rising sex 
ratio imbalance accounts for about half of the actual increase in the household savings 
rate during 1990-2007. If the sex ratio is correlated with our income inequality 
measures, our estimation of the effect of income inequality without controlling for the 
sex ratio is biased. In the fourth column in Table 5, we include the sex ratio variable 
used by Wei and Zhang (2009), which is the sex ratio for the age cohort 7-21. 
Controlling for the sex ratio does not change our main result. Sex ratio indeed has a 
negative coefficient, though not statistically significant in our sample. 
The last alternative story is about the correlation between inequality and 
downward income risks. Generally, higher income risks result in more precautionary 
savings and less consumption. Therefore, rising inequality can have a negative impact 
on consumption due to the increase in income risks instead of the status-seeking 
motive.  
To test this, we exploit the fact that the Urban Household Survey is a rotating 
panel and measure the downward income risk by calculating the proportion of families 
in a province-age group who experienced a decrease in income for families who are in 
the sample two yeas in a row.24 We find that the correlation between income inequality 
and downward income risk is 0.33, but only 30% of the families experienced a 
                                                             
24
 The urban household survey does not have a consistent identifier for each family until 2002. Thus, 
this part focuses on the survey in 2002-2006. We construct a 2-year panel with 17000 families.  
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decrease in income, and less than 15% of the families had a decrease of more than 
10%. Moreover, after we add the downward income risk variable in the baseline model 
(column 5 in Table 5), the negative effect of Gini is even larger, which indicates that 
the income risk is not the reason for the negative effect of income inequality on 
consumption.25  
  
8 Conclusions  
The rapid increase in income inequality in China and the substantial variation in 
inequality across regions and groups provide us a good opportunity to test the 
status-seeking hypothesis. Our simple theoretical model illustrates that households 
tend to save more when the income gap widens because of the status-saving incentives, 
but the impacts are different for different income levels: the rich save normally as 
achieving a high-status is easy, the middle-class save excessively in order to achieve a 
higher status, and the poor simply give up. The model also shows that the young saves 
more than the old. 
Empirical results support these theoretical predictions. Using China Urban 
Household Survey data, we find that income has a negative impact on household 
consumption after we control for the income effect itself. The estimate indicates rising 
inequality can explain a large part of the declining consumption as a percentage of 
income between 1997 and 2006. In our sample, the urban Gini coefficient rose from 
0.23 in 1997 to 0.29 in 2006 on average, which can explain 23% of the decline of 
urban household consumption during this period.  
In addition, the negative effect of income inequality on consumption is stronger 
                                                             
25
 Without considering the income risk, the estimated coefficient of Gini in the baseline model is -0.42 
using the sample of that period. 
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for poorer and younger people. We also find that the rising inequality has encouraged 
families to invest more in children’s education, and the effect does not differ much 
between the rich and the poor. These results are robust to different inequality measures 
and different model specifications.26 However, we do not find the poor in our sample 
giving up. The results are consistent with the story that people save to improve their 
social status, which is associated with both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, and 
rising income inequality strengthens this motive.  
                                                             
26
 Other sensitivity tests we have tried include: deflating all the nominal variables using the provincial 
CPI, excluding families with heads under 30 and over 65, and excluding the samples of 1997-2001. 
Again, the results demonstrate the robustness of our estimations. Results are available from the authors. 
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Figure 1  Three Scenarios on the Status-seeking Savings 
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Figure 2  Optimal Savings and Comparative Statics 
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Figure 3  The Trend of Average Propensity to Consume and Income Inequality  
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Figure 4  The Variation of the Gini Coefficient across Provinces and Age Groups 
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Table 1 The Effect of Income Inequality on Household Consumption 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Consumption) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Gini -0.382*** -0.348*** -0.347*** -0.419*** 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.109) 
     
ln(Income) 0.763*** 0.798*** 0.772*** 0.763*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) 
 
Five Income Quintile 
Group Dummies 
 
 Y Y  
 
Five Income Quintile 
Dummies*ln(Income) 
 
  Y  
 
Reference Group’s 
Specific Trend 
 
   Y 
Obs. 102971 102971 102971 102971 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Note: Consumption has excluded education expenditure. The regressions are estimated by 
OLS. We control for the year, province and age group fixed effect and the average income 
of the reference group, and the age of the head in every regression. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. Three stars indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence 
level; two stars at the 5% level, one star at the 10% level. 
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Table 2  The Effect of Inequality on Consumption for Different Income Groups 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Consumption) 
 Whole Sample The Poor The Middle The Rich 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Gini -0.530*** -0.454*** -0.358** -0.303* 
 (0.101) (0.140) (0.146) (0.169) 
     
ln(Income) 0.776*** 0.758*** 0.800*** 0.778*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) 
     
Middle -0.057**    
 (0.025)    
     
Rich -0.100***    
 (0.027)    
     
Middle*Gini 0.197**    
 (0.089)    
     
Rich*Gini 0.269***    
 (0.097)    
     
Obs. 102971 33599 34278 35094 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.64 0.55 0.55 
Note: Consumption has excluded education expenditure. The definition of the poor is the 
poorest 50% and the rich is the richest 50%. The regressions are estimated by OLS. We 
control for the year, province and age group fixed effect and the average income of the 
reference group, and the age of the head in every regression. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. Three stars indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence 
level; two stars at the 5% level, one star at the 10% level. 
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Table 3  The Effect of Inequality on Household Consumption for Different Age Groups 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Consumption) 
 Whole Sample The Young (head age <55) 
The Old (head 
age≥55) 
Whole 
Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Gini -0.248** -0.604*** -0.261 -0.601*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.178) (0.150) 
     
ln(Income) 0.763*** 0.770*** 0.740*** 0.763*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
     
Young Dummy 0.035    
 (0.031)    
     
Young *Gini -0.185*    
 (0.104)    
     
(Age 35-45)* Gini    0.217 
    (0.142) 
     
(Age 45-55)* Gini    0.173 
    (0.151) 
     
(Age 55-65)* Gini    0.161 
    (0.172) 
     
Age over 65* Gini    0.553*** 
    (0.203) 
     
Obs. 102971 78492 24479 102971 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.69 
Note: Consumption has excluded education expenditure. The definition of the young is that 
the head is younger than 55, while the old is that the head is older than 55. The regressions 
are estimated by OLS. We control for the year, province and age group fixed effect and the 
average income of the reference group, and the age of the head in every regression. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Three stars indicate statistical significance at the 
1% confidence level; two stars at the 5% level, one star at the 10% level. 
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Table 4  The Effect of Inequality on Households’ Education Expenditure 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Education Expenditure) 
 
Whole 
Sample 
Whole 
Sample The Poor The Middle The Rich 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Gini 4.956*** 3.800*** 2.509 2.288 6.281*** 
 (0.507) (1.158) (1.784) (1.663) (1.696) 
      
ln(Income) 0.968*** 0.750*** 0.815*** 0.516*** 0.787*** 
 (0.051) (0.057) (0.086) (0.147) (0.089) 
      
Middle  -0.044    
  (0.268)    
      
Rich  0.485*    
  (0.264)    
      
Middle*Gini  0.565    
  (0.936)    
      
Rich*Gini  -0.899    
  (0.940)    
      
Young      
      
      
Young*Gini      
      
      
Obs. 75224 75224 25623 25249 24352 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.22 
Note: The regressions are estimated by OLS. We control for the year, province and age group 
fixed effect and the average income of the reference group, and the age of the head in every 
regression. Five Income quintile group dummies and their interaction with income are 
controlled in the first regression. The definition of the young is that the head is younger than 
55, while the old is that the head is older than 55. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Three stars indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; two stars 
at the 5% level, one star at the 10% level. 
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Table 5  Robust Test--The Effect of Inequality on Food Consumption and Alternative 
Stories 
Dependent Variable: ln(Cereals Expenditure) 
ln(Food 
Expenditure) ln(Consumption) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) （5） 
      
Gini -0.062 -0.148* -0.392*** -0.384*** -0.413*** 
 (0.171) (0.083) (0.093) (0.089) (0.111) 
      
ln(Income) 0.044*** 0.499*** 0.763*** 0.763*** 0.760*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
      
  0.013   ln(Provincial 
Housing Price) 
  (0.038)   
      
Sex Ratio    -0.254  
    (0.362)  
      
    0.029 Downward Income 
Risks 
    (0.046) 
      
Obs. 76413 103086 92284 102971 63372 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.57 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Note: Consumption has excluded education expenditure. In column (5) we use the samples of 
year 2003-2006. Using the samples of this period, the estimated coefficient of Gini is -0.42 in 
the baseline model without the measure of income risk. The regressions are estimated by 
OLS. We control for the year, province and age group fixed effect and the average income of 
the reference group, and the age of the head in every regression. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. Three stars indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; 
two stars at the 5% level, one star at the 10% level. 
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Appendix A 
Table A  Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Variables 
 year N mean sd 
     
1997 5392 0.232 0.033 
    
1998 5382 0.243 0.033 
    
1999 5378 0.244 0.027 
    
2000 5355 0.270 0.034 
    
2001 5378 0.271 0.031 
    
2002 12878 0.274 0.035 
    
2003 14379 0.286 0.041 
    
2004 15593 0.289 0.038 
    
2005 16677 0.288 0.037 
    
2006 16822 0.289 0.039 
    
Gini Coefficient 
Total 103234 0.277 0.041 
     
Other Main Variables     
     
Disposable Income  104665 28178 21101 
     
Consumption (excluding education 
expenditure)  104550 21858 17099 
     
APC (excluding education expenditure)  104541 0.77 0.31 
     
APC  104551 0.84 0.55 
     
Education Expenditure  104665 1629 3094 
     
Education (year)  104665 11.58 2.99 
     
Family Equivalent Scale  104665 2.28 0.49 
     
Family Size  104665 3.00 0.77 
     
Age  104665 48.31 11.32 
 
 
 
 
